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ABSTRACT
PIPEs (Private Investments in Public Equity) are unique in that they are
negotiated privately between sophisticated investors and the public firm. As a result, the
issue price deviates from the firm's stock price, often resulting in a substantial PIPE
discount. However, only a limited set of firms issues equity at such a discount. PIPE
issuers tend to be low quality, less transparent firms that cannot raise capital through
traditional sources. As indicators of this quality, I examine the firm's accruals and audit
quality in the year of its PIPE issuance. I find that the PIPE discount is more strongly
associated with audit quality, and that firms with low quality auditors are issued at a 5%
discount relative to comparable firms with high quality auditors. Much of this discount is
due to self-selection, suggesting that higher quality PIPE issuers select high quality
auditors.
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Title: Interim Deputy Dean, Gordon Y Billard Professor of Management and Accounting
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I. Introduction
Private investments in public equity (PIPEs) have grown dramatically in recent
years - the total proceeds from PIPE transactions increased from $1.9 billion in 1995 to
$52.9 billion in 2005. Much of this growth can be attributed to the unique features of the
PIPE market, which make it an attractive setting for both firms and investors. For many
small firms, PIPEs are a fast and convenient source of capital because they allow these
firms to raise money quickly and with few regulatory restrictions (Brophy et al., 2004).
Similarly, for many large investors, PIPEs are a lucrative use of capital because they
allow these investors to purchase equity at a substantial discount to the market price
(Hertzel et al., 2002).'
Nevertheless, only a limited set of firms issues equity at such a discount. PIPE
issuers tend to be young, small, less transparent firms that have difficulty raising capital
from traditional sources (Chaplinsky and Haushalter, 2003).2 These firms suffer from
severe information problems, are more difficult to value, and are more likely to be
misvalued by public investors (Brophy et al., 2004). As such, PIPE investors expend
substantial resources determining the value of these firms (Hertzel and Smith, 1993), and
likely discount PIPEs according to their quality.
As indicators of this quality, I examine two measures that have generated
significant interest in the accounting literature. First, I examine the firm's information
intermediaries in the year of its PIPE issuance. Information intermediaries may be
' Investors often offer a substantial discount for firms that issue PIPEs in order to compensate for their
inability to trade the PIPE before SEC approval. After the investors and the company agree on the
transaction, the company must register the PIPE with the SEC. During this process, investors cannot trade
in the security.
2 Diamond (1989) suggests that young firms have high degrees of information asymmetry because of their
short financial history.
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particularly important in the PIPE market, where most issuers have a high degree of
information asymmetry (Brophy et al., 2004). By certifying firm value, intermediaries
can enhance the credibility of financial statements and provide greater reassurance to
investors that the firm's stock price is representative of the firm's true value (Menon and
Williams, 1994). This reduces information asymmetry and mitigates adverse selection
problems associated with equity issuances (Myers and Majluf, 1984). As such, firms
with favorable private information may differentiate themselves by hiring high quality
intermediaries (Slovin et al., 1990). Since many PIPE issuers do not hire placement
agents, I focus on the firm's audit quality as a measure of its intermediary quality.
Second, I look at the firm's accruals. High quality accruals can increase the
quality of the firm's financial statements and decrease uncertainty about its financial
condition (Bharath et al., 2004). This reduces information asymmetry between the firm
and investors (Francis et al., 2005). Accruals can also directly affect firm quality through
earnings management. Prior research suggests that firms have incentives to manage
accruals prior to issuing equity (Kim et al., 2006). Accordingly, accruals are positively
related with equity-financing decisions (Kothari et al., 2006) and negatively related with
post-issuance returns (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998).
I find that firms with low quality auditors are issued at a 5% discount relative to
comparable firms with high quality auditors. Much of this discount is due to self-
selection, suggesting that high (low) quality PIPE issuers select high (low) quality
auditors. I also find that firms do not manage earnings prior to issuing PIPEs. In contrast
to SEOs (Secondary Equity Offerings), PIPEs are issued to sophisticated investors and
-6-
this may dissuade firms from managing accruals. Consequently, accruals are not priced
by PIPE investors
This paper makes several contributions to the existing research. Silber (1991)
attributes the PIPE discount to liquidity costs associated with the transaction. However,
PIPE issuers have a high degree of information asymmetry and this paper examines the
importance of information quality to PIPE investors.3 Second, prior research suggests
that auditors provide information and monitoring to investors (Beatty and Ritter, 1986).
However, PIPE investors are sophisticated blockholders, and their demand for these roles
may be limited. Instead, I suggest that self-selection plays an important role. Firms self-
select into high and low quality auditees (Chaney et al., 2004), and PIPE investors
discount characteristics of firms with low quality auditors. The results from the two-
stage regression confirm the importance of self-selection in the PIPE market.
Finally, from the firm's perspective, the PIPE discount measures the firm's cost of
capital.4  As such, I test the relation between accruals, auditors, and the firm's cost of
raising capital in the PIPE market. In doing so, I examine whether accruals and audit
quality can be used to differentiate between low and high quality PIPE issuers.
This paper proceeds in seven sections. Section 2 presents the background.
Section 3 describes the related literature. Section 4 describes the hypotheses
development. Section 5 outlines the research design. Section 6 presents the results.
Section 7 provides the robustness tests and Section 8 concludes.
3 Given that many PIPEs are issued without placement agents, auditors are the main intermediary in the
issuance process. The firm's choice of auditors is then one of the few ways they can signal their quality to
investors.
4 There is substantial cross-sectional variation in the PIPE discount. Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2006)
suggest that "for this reason, PIPEs data present an opportunity to conduct relatively powerful tests of
hypotheses about offer price discounts."
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2. The PIPE Market
2.1 Regulatory Framework
Regulation D allows companies to issue unregistered securities to a select group
of investors, but according to Rule 144, investors cannot trade in these securities until one
year after the close of the deal. 5 In order to bypass these resale restrictions, firms can
register the shares with the SEC after negotiations are completed (Eckbo et al., 2007).
The SEC often declares effective these shares within ninety days after registration,
thereby eliminating any resale restrictions to the investor.6 This registration procedure is
important in providing liquidity to investors, and turning the PIPE from a private
investment to a publicly traded investment (Chaplinsky and Haushalter, 2003). As
Pinedo and Tannenbaum (2002) describe, "issuers prefer [PIPEs] because they are not
burdened with significant post-closing requirements... Investors prefer PIPEs over
conventional private placements because of the certainty of prompt liquidity."
Once the shares are registered, the PIPE deal is announced, and investors often
take control of the shares without any resale restrictions. While some investors are
subject to an extended lock-up period, under Rule 10b5-1 of the Exchange Act, all
investors are prohibited from trading in the issuing firm before the announcement date.
5 Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) suggest that "the logic behind allowing unregistered offerings in private
placements is based on the view that sophisticated investors have the knowledge and the resources to
independently evaluate issuing firms' investment opportunities."
6 The closing of the PIPE transaction is dependent on the SEC's approval of the registration statement. In
some cases, the SEC can take more than ninety days to declare effective the registration statement.
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2.2 Institutional Details
For purposes of this paper, I focus on traditional PIPEs, where common stock is
issued at a pre-defined price to private investors. These PIPE transactions are the most
common and represent close to 80% of all PIPE transactions (Dresner and Kim, 2003).
Other PIPEs include fixed-rate convertibles, where the bond has a fixed conversion price,
and floating-rate convertibles, where the bond has a floating conversion price that is
dependent on the underlying stock price. The conversion features make it difficult to
calculate a discount for these PIPEs, and I exclude them from my analysis.
Due to the lack of regulation in the PIPE market, firms typically complete PIPE
transactions in two months. After the investors and the company agree on a price and
offer size, the SEC must declare effective a resale registration statement (Dresner and
Kim, 2003). Once the SEC approves the resale registration, the transaction closes. It is
at this point that the deal is consummated, and the investors pay the firm the negotiated
deal price (Pinedo and Tannenbaum, 2002).
Over the past ten years, the majority of PIPEs were carried out by private equity
firms and hedge funds. These investors share similarities in that their portfolios are more
likely to be concentrated on a particular company; therefore, compared to other
institutional investors like mutual funds and pension funds, they have a greater stake in
each of their investments. In addition, their compensation is more strongly linked to their
returns (often, 20% of the fund's total profits for a given year), so they reap more of the
gains and losses on each investment compared to other institutional managers (Ackerman
et al., 1999). Given the opportunity to purchase equity at a discount, large investors are
finding the PIPE market increasingly lucrative. As seen from Figure 1, the PIPE market
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has grown dramatically over the past ten years. In 2006, over 2,700 PIPEs were issued
with total proceeds of $87.9 billion while in 1996, 351 PIPEs were issued with total
proceeds of $9.1 billion.
Similarly, because of the speed at which the capital changes hands, small and
financially constrained firms are increasingly relying on PIPEs as a fast and convenient
source of financing. In particular, Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003) suggest that the
"small size of PIPE issues and issuers, along with their poor operating performance likely
rule out public debt issuances and make other forms of debt ill advised." This suggests
that PIPEs often remain the only source of financing for small, financially constrained
firms.
There are trade-offs for both parties involved in PIPE transactions. For investors,
entering into a PIPE is highly speculative and the losses from such deals could
significantly cut-into their profits. For firms, PIPEs are issued at a steep discount to the
market price. As such, PIPE transactions increase public scrutiny and often result in
shareholder resentment.7
3. Related Literature
This section examines the prior research on equity issuances and accruals.
Section 3.1 discusses the literature on public and private equity issuances, with particular
emphasis on the similarities between the two streams of research. Section 3.2 describes
the role of auditors in raising capital and Section 3.3 discusses the literature on accruals.
In each section, I draw attention to the contributions of my paper.
7 "Regaining Acceptance, PIPEs deals are getting bigger." Reuters, May 2, 2005.
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3.1 Research on Equity Issuances
Myers and Majluf (1984) provide a framework for financing decisions when
managers have private information about firm value. In this framework, managers issue
equity when their private valuation is less than the market's valuation. Investors expect
this and offer a marked-down price for firms that issue equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Asquith and Mullins (1986) substantiate this by showing that stock prices fall 3% around
SEO issues. As Myers (2001) describes:
"On average, the companies that issue shares decide to do so at a fair
price. However, the companies that decide to issue are, on average,
worth less than the companies that hold back. Investors downgrade the
prices of issuing firms accordingly. "
Much of the prior literature on private placements also focuses on the market's
reaction to the issuance announcement. Wruck (1989) finds announcement returns of 2%
to firms that issue PIPEs. Hertzel and Smith (1993) find a similar positive reaction,
despite the fact that private placements are issued at a mean discount of 20%. Hertzel
and Smith (1993) suggest that private investors discount issuers in order to compensate
for due diligence costs associated with the PIPE transaction, and they attribute the
positive announcement return to positive news associated with the issuer's more
sophisticated investor base. Wruck (1989) argues that the market reacts positively
because high quality firms are more likely to enter the PIPE market than the SEO market.
However, recent research documents negative long-term returns following PIPE
issuances. Hertzel et al. (2002) find that while initially the market reacts positively to
placement announcements, there is a strong negative drift in the years following PIPE
issuances. The authors find that the mean three-year post-PIPE abnormal returns are
-11-
significantly negative at -23.8%. Consistent with this, Brophy et al. (2004) find that the
average PIPE issuer earns market-adjusted returns of-18.49% in the five-hundred trading
days following the PIPE announcement.8  This evidence of a strong negative drift
following the PIPE announcement indicates that PIPE issuers are actually overvalued:
"the evidence suggests that investors are too optimistic about the prospects of firms that
issue equity, regardless of the form of issuance" (Hertzel et al., 2002).
I suggest that private investors demand a discount for firms that issue PIPEs.
This discount is necessary in order to compensate for liquidity costs associated with the
PIPE transaction: once negotiations are completed, the company must register the PIPE
with the SEC, and during this process private investors are not allowed to trade shares in
the firm. Therefore, regardless of the firm's type, private investors will often demand a
discount for PIPEs in order to be compensated for their inability to trade the PIPE before
SEC approval.
Firms rationally expect that investors discount PIPEs. This dissuades many high
quality firms from issuing PIPEs because they are unwilling to issue equity at too low of
a price. Similar to the Myers and Majluf (1984), then, low quality firms are more likely
to issue PIPEs than high quality firms (Appendix 3).
It may seem counterintuitive that private investors purchase shares in these firms,
rather than short them in the open market. However, investors purchase PIPEs at
substantial discounts (the average common stock PIPE was sold at a 10% discount).9
s The authors also find that structured PIPE issuers perform significantly worse and earn market-adjusted
returns of -35.41% over this same time period.
9 Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) find that PIPE issuers have negative stock returns, but that private investors
earn normal returns because they are able to purchase the stock at a discount.
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Also, it is likely that there are substantial costs to shorting the stock since PIPE issuers
are small, less liquid firms (Gomes and Phillips, 2004). Moreover, many PIPE investors
(specifically, mutual funds, pension funds and corporations) are restricted from shorting
stocks.
3.2 Research on Auditors
Auditors play an important role in the equity and debt issuance process. Pittman
and Fortin (2004) examine the relation between auditor choice and the firm's cost of debt
and find that audit quality affects the cost of debt, particularly for younger firms with
shorter financial histories. The authors suggest that "retaining a Big Six auditor, which
can reduce debt-monitoring costs by enhancing the credibility of financial statements,
enables young firms to reduce their borrowing costs." Slovin et al. (1990) is one of the
few papers that examine the relation between audit quality and the discount associated
with secondary equity offerings. They find a smaller issuance discount for firms with
higher quality auditors, suggesting that "managers with unfavorable asymmetric
information are less likely to retain the services of high-reputation outside accountants
because such auditors are likely to detect and report this unfavorable information." 10
Titman and Trueman (1986) and Datar et al. (1991) show that audit quality is negatively
associated with IPO underpricing. Similarly, Beatty (1989) finds that IPOs with high
quality auditors experience less underpricing, and Michaely and Shaw (1995) find that
IPOs with smaller auditors underperform those with Big-8 auditors.
10 Rauterkus et al. (2003) also examine audit quality in the secondary equity offering market. They find
that firms audited by Arthur Anderson after the Enron collapse had a higher SEO discount.
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In the PIPE setting the company's stock is traded prior to its issuance; therefore,
audit quality may already be discounted into stock prices prior to the PIPE. In this paper,
I argue that PIPE issuers can distinguish themselves by their choice of auditor. Higher
quality firms choose higher quality auditors in order to convey favorable information to
investors. Thus, auditors can mitigate the adverse selection problem associated with
PIPE issuances, and audit quality (as it relates to PIPE issuances) may not be reflected in
the firm's stock price until the PIPE is issued. There is negative information revealed
through a PIPE issuance, but having a higher quality auditor reduces the magnitude of
this negative information.
The PIPE setting is also unique in that only sophisticated investors participate in
the offering. Their demand for auditors has not fully been explored in the literature, and
this paper allows me to test the price that sophisticated investors place on audit quality.
In doing so, I show that self-selection explains much of the discount placed on low
quality audits. In contrast, much of the literature does not test why audit quality is priced,
nor does it consider the importance of self-selection.
3.3 Research on Accruals
My first motivation for studying accruals stems from the earnings management
literature. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) find that firms have high discretionary
accruals around SEOs. They suggest that firms manage earnings upwards prior to the
SEO in order to attract investment and that "investors may misinterpret high reported
earnings at the time of the offering, and consequently overvalue new issues." Richardson
(1998) finds that earnings management prior to SEOs is positively associated with the
-14-
firm's degree of information asymmetry, suggesting that high discretionary accruals
increase uncertainty about the firm's financial condition.
It is unclear whether earnings management plays a role in the PIPE setting. PIPEs
are issued to a select group of sophisticated investors, and this may dissuade issuers from
managing earnings. Thus, it is an empirical question whether PIPE issuers manage
accruals, and whether PIPE investors discount firms with high discretionary accruals.11
My second motivation for studying accruals stems from the accruals quality
literature. Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure accruals quality by the estimation noise
in accruals, where high accruals quality implies a better match between current accruals
and current, past, and future cash flows (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Francis et al.
(2005) examine the relation between accruals quality and the firm's cost of capital. The
authors examine seven measures of earnings quality and conclude that "higher quality
earnings provide a more precise signal to investors" and that "more precise (higher
quality) accounting information reduces the cost of capital" (Francis et al., 2005).
However, for accruals quality to be priced in the PIPE market, PIPE investors must price
accruals differently than the equity market prices accruals. Therefore, this paper tests
whether PIPE investors place an additional discount on firms with lower quality accruals.
" The PIPE setting also allows for a direct test of whether sophisticated investors understand accruals,
which is especially important given the mixed evidence in the prior literature. Bradshaw, Richardson, and
Sloan (2001) suggest that analysts have limited ability to process accruals information. In contrast, Collins,
Gong, and Hribar (2003) and Lev and Nissim (2006) find that changes in institutional ownership are
negatively related to the firm's accruals in the prior year. These papers offer mixed evidence on whether
sophisticated investors understand the accruals anomaly. Furthermore, Collins et al. (2003) and Lev and
Nissim (2006) do not test directly whether institutional investors price accruals - instead, they attribute any
change in the firm's institutional ownership to its accruals. This paper, on the other hand, uses the PIPE
discount, which is a direct measure of the price that private investors value the firm.
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4. Hypotheses Development
This section presents the main hypotheses of my paper. First, I develop
predictions on the relation between the PIPE discount, accruals, and auditor quality.
Second, I test alternative reasons why PIPE investors may price audit quality.
4.1 Accruals Hypotheses
Low accruals quality can increase estimation problems and asymmetric
information between firms and investors (Lee and Masulis, 2005). As such, accruals can
affect the cost of the PIPE transaction. Hertzel and Smith (1993) suggest that "when the
value of the firm is more difficult to assess and more important to assess carefully,
investors in private placements will expend more resources to determine firm value, and
thus will require large discounts." Consistent with this, Bharath et al. (2004) find that
banks incur higher transaction costs and charge higher rates when providing loans to
firms with low accruals quality. Given that low quality firms are more difficult to value,
the due diligence costs associated with the PIPE transaction are likely to be higher.
Accruals quality can also affect the risk of the transaction. Specifically, low
quality accruals decrease the quality of accounting information and the predictability of
future cash flows (Bharath et al., 2004). This increases uncertainty about the firm's
financial condition and increases information asymmetry between the firm and PIPE
investors. Since the negative news associated with equity issuances is "largely consistent
-16-
with asymmetric information" (Lee and Masulis, 2005), I expect PIPE investors to
discount firms with low accruals quality. 12
Hla: Accruals Quality is Negatively Associated with the PIPE Discount.
Accruals may also be associated with the PIPE discount because of earnings
management. Prior research suggests that firms manage accruals upwards prior to
issuing equity in order to attract investment (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998), and firms
with higher accruals tend to have less persistent and less sustainable earnings
(Richardson, 2003). While naive investors may have limited ability to read through this
earnings management, sophisticated investors "have complicated screening and
evaluation techniques to underpin their investment decision" and accounting
manipulation should be uncovered through this process (Beuselinck et al., 2004). If this
is the case, then I expect PIPE investors to discount firms with high accruals. This leads
to the following hypothesis:
Hlb: Accruals are Positively Associated with the PIPE Discount.
4.2 Auditor Hypotheses
Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a framework where managers have private
information about firm value. High quality firms avoid issuing equity because it requires
them to issue at too low of a price. This creates an adverse selection problem, where
investors assume that lower quality firms issue equity. In order to reduce the adverse
12 These explanations assume that the market does not sufficiently impound information about accruals into
stock prices. If the market fully incorporates information about accruals into stock prices, then PIPE
investors should not further discount accruals.
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selection problem associated with equity issuances, firms can employ higher quality
auditors (Slovin et al., 1990):
"The reputation of outside auditors can reduce uncertainty and mitigate
the negative signals with unexpected events such as equity issuances...
maintaining a high-reputation accounting firm contributes to the
reputation of managers which lessens the market's presumption that...
[an] equity announcement impounds unfavorable information."
Auditors play an important role in certifying the firm's financial condition. These
responsibilities are especially important in the PIPE market. Many PIPE issuers do not
hire placement agents; therefore, their choice of auditors is one of the few ways they can
credibly signal their quality. Also, most PIPE issuers are small, young, and highly
distressed - such firms suffer from information problems and are more likely to rely on
expert intermediaries (Rauterkus et al., 2003).
High quality auditors have strong incentives to avoid low quality issuers - they
incur higher litigation and reputation costs by being associated with these firms
(Michaely and Shaw, 1995). Auditors of significantly underperforming firms are subject
to lawsuits, and high quality auditors are more vulnerable to large lawsuits because of
their deeper pockets (Dye, 1993). These lawsuits may be more common in the PIPE
market, where many firms delist due to poor performance. Also, high quality auditors
have high reputational capital and associating themselves with low quality firms limits
their ability to charge higher fees or to attract new business (Michaely and Shaw, 1995).
Thus, high quality auditors are selective in their choice of clients, and are more likely to
avoid lower quality issuers. Consistent with this, Michaely and Shaw (1995) find that
high quality auditors "have an incentive to associate themselves with IPOs that are less
likely to underperform in the long-run."
- 18-
Similarly, low quality firms may not have the capability or the incentive to select
higher quality auditors. These auditors charge higher fees, and are more adept at
uncovering unfavorable information (Michaely and Shaw, 1995). This may dissuade
many low quality issuers from hiring high quality auditors.
Thus, firms can convey favorable information by selecting high quality auditors.
Relative to low quality auditors, high quality auditors provide greater reassurance to PIPE
investors that the firm's stock price is reflective of the firm's true value. This reduces the
adverse selection problem associated with (and the negative information conveyed by)
PIPE issuances. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Auditor Quality is Negatively Associated with the PIPE Discount.
4.2.1 Self-Selection
Throughout this paper, I suggest that high quality firms and auditors have
incentives to select each other. Chaney et al. (2004) argue that "since client firms are not
randomly assigned to audit firms, it is likely that firms select [high quality] and [low
quality] auditees based on firm characteristics." Consistent with this, Ireland and Lennox
(2002) find that high quality auditors have clients that are of above-average quality and
require less effort to audit. They suggest that high quality auditors have strong incentives
to avoid low quality issuers since they incur higher reputation costs by being associated
with these firms. Likewise, low quality firms may not have the incentive to select higher
quality auditors since they charge higher fees and are more likely to uncover negative
information (Michaely and Shaw, 1995).
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Consequently, PIPE investors may not necessarily discount audit quality, but
characteristics of firms with low quality auditors. This argument holds particular weight
in the PIPE market, where investor naivety is not a source of the variation in the discount.
Unlike regular market participations, PIPE investors are sophisticated investors that
conduct extensive due diligence on their investments (Dresner and Kim, 2003).13 Their
portfolios are more likely to be concentrated in a particular company and they can take an
active role by joining a PIPE issuer's board of directors (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001).14
This "closer relationship may reduce agency conflicts as well as the demand for financial
statements as a monitoring mechanism" (Chaney et al., 2004).
Further, PIPE negotiations allow potential investors to gather considerable
information on the issuing firm and "can potentially enable [them] to overcome some of
the informational asymmetries associated with [PIPE issuers]" (Chaplinsky and
Haushalter, 2003). 15  Overall, this suggests that, relative to naive investors, PIPE
investors may be less reliant on auditors and less harmed by low quality audits.
Therefore, if the PIPE discount is associated with audit quality, it is likely that self-
selection plays a role.
I directly test for self-selection by estimating a two-stage regression. Private
investors may discount low audit quality because of reasons unrelated to audit quality.
The independent variables in a one-stage regression analysis may not sufficiently control
~3 PIPE investors should have the sophistication and breadth to certify and monitor the firm's financial
statements on their own.
14 Recent examples include KKR's convertible PIPE with Sun Microsystems and HBK Investment's
common stock PIPE with Bluefly. In both instances, the PIPE contract stated that the participating
investors were to place a member of their investment team on the company's board.
15 PIPE negotiations may provide investors an opportunity to collect non-public information from the
issuing company.
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for this (Mansi et al., 2004). Accordingly, I first model the auditor choice decision, then I
measure the relation between audit quality and the PIPE discount after controlling for
selectivity:
H3: Auditor Quality is not Associated with the PIPE Discount after
Controlling for Selectivity.
V. Research Design
5.1 Data
I collect PIPE data from Sagient Research's Placement Tracker database. The
database is comprehensive in that it provides the investor type, the closing date of the
transaction, the gross proceeds, the purchase price, and various other institutional
measures. For purposes of this analysis, I focus on the PIPE issuer's accruals and auditor
quality, as well as on the PIPE discount.
I examine common stock PIPEs on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq between 1995
and 2005, and I look at Compustat data available in the year prior to the PIPE closing
date. Auditor type is identified from Compustat, which provides the auditor name and
the audit opinion code.
Following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005), I measure the firm's accruals by
its performance-matched discretionary accruals. I delete all firms with unsigned
discretionary accruals that are greater than one. Also, I require that each PIPE issuer has
sufficient data to calculate the accruals measures. I exclude firms with a negative book
value of equity and firms with a market capitalization of less than $10 million.
As seen from Table 1, the final sample consists of 1,102 PIPE transactions from
1995 to 2005. Table 2 shows that the average firm in the sample has a market value of
-21-
$288 million, total assets of $207 million, and PIPE deal size of $19.6 million. The
average return on assets of -39.8% is consistent with Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003)
and Brophy et al. (2004), who find that most PIPE issuers are distressed firms. Figure 2
provides the distribution of the market capitalization of PIPE issuers. As seen from the
graph, most PIPE issuers have a market value less than $100 million. This is consistent
with the notion that the PIPE market is comprised largely of small firms that are unable to
issue equity in the secondary market due to the high fixed costs associated with SEOs.
Figure 3 provides the distribution of the discount of PIPE issuers. While there is
substantial variance in the PIPE discounts, most are centered around -10%.
I measure abnormal accruals using the indirect approach. As a starting point, I
estimate the cross-sectional Jones model regression for all firm-year observations in the
same two-digit SIC codes:
TAit/Assetsit-. = 31(1/Assetsit-1) + P2(ARevit/Assetsit-1) + P3(PPEit/Assetsit-) + cit, (1)
where:
- TA: (ACA - ACL - ACash + AStDebt - Depn).
- Assets: Total assets (Compustat #6).
- ARev: Change in revenues (Compustat #12) from year t to t-1.
- PPE: Gross value of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat #7).
- ACA: Change in current assets (Compustat #4) from year t to t-1.
- ACL: Change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) from year t to t- 1.
- AStDebt: Change in short-term debt (Compustat #34) from year t to t-1.
- Depn: Depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14).
The coefficients from equation (1) are then used in equation (2) to estimate the
modified Jones model from Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995):
NAit = 0i*(1/Assetsit-) + *'2[(ARevit-AARit/Assetsitl- ] + 0'3(PPEit/Assetsit.l) + sit, (2)
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where:
- NA: Estimate of normal accruals.
- Assets: Total assets (Compustat #6).
- ARev: Change in revenues (Compustat #12) from year t to t-1.
- AAR: Change in accounts receivable (Compustat #2) from year t to t-1.
- PPE: Gross value of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat #7).
The abnormal accruals are found by taking the scaled total accruals minus the
scaled normal accruals. Given that PIPE issuers have significantly negative return on
assets, it is important to performance match their accruals (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley,
2005). I partition each of the industry SIC codes into deciles based on their ROA, and
the performance-matched discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between
firm i's abnormal accruals, and the abnormal accruals for the firm's industry ROA decile
(Francis et al., 2005):
Accrualsit = AAit - IndAAit (3)
Finally, following Dechow and Dichev (2002), I estimate the following
regression, where all variables are scaled by total assets:
TCAit = 0o + P1CFOit-I + 02CFOit + f3CFOit+l + Fit, (4)
where:
- TCA: (ACA - ACL - ACash + AStDebt).
- CFO: Net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) - TA.
The Dechow and Dichev measure determines the degree to which working capital
accruals map into operating cash flows (Dechow and Dichev, 2002).16 The regression
16 Wysocki (2005) argues that the Dechow and Dichev measure is limited in that it picks up a negative
correlation between accruals and cash flows. He offers a modification of the Dechow and Dichev model,
which looks at the incremental R2 of regressions of cash flows on current accruals. Given that most of the
firms that issue PIPEs are relatively young firms, I was unable to estimate the model using Wysocki's
modification.
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produces firm and year-specific residuals, which are used as the accruals quality measure
(Francis et al., 2005). A higher residual corresponds to lower accruals quality:
AccrualsQualityit = I eit 1 (5)
5.2 Methodology
The first and second hypotheses examine whether private investors discount
accruals and audit quality, respectively. I estimate the following regression:
Discountit = ,o + f/lAccrualsMeasureit + / 2LowAuditQualityi, + P3MVit
+ /34MBit + PlsDebtit + fl6PIPESizeit + f 7Priceit + 8sROAit + e (6)
where:
- Discount:
- AccrualsMeasure:
- LowAuditQuality:
-MV:
- MB:
- Debt:
- PIPESize:
- Price:
- ROA:
Size of the discount/premium on the PIPE, where a positive value
corresponds to a PIPE price higher than the market price.
Performance-matched discretionary accruals or accruals quality.
One if the firm did not retain a Big-4 auditor in the year of its PIPE
issuance, and zero otherwise.
Market value of equity.
Market-to-book ratio.
Total debt divided by total assets.
Proceeds from the PIPE issuance.
PIPE offer price.
Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.
I include PIPESize and MV because Hertzel and Smith (1993) find that discounts
are larger when the value of the PIPE is large relative to the market value of the firm.
MB controls for differences in risk between low market-to-book and high market-to-book
firms (Fama and French, 1993). Debt is included because levered firms may have lower
discounts since it shows that they obtained debt financing; in contrast, many PIPE issuers
do not have any debt because they cannot obtain money from lenders. Price is included
because stocks with low prices are harder to market (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2001). ROA
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controls for profitability, since investors likely focus on the firm's ability to generate
income.
I classify firms with low quality auditors as those that did not retain a Big-4
auditor in the year of the PIPE issuance. Auditor size is often used as a proxy for audit
quality, because "larger audit firms supply higher quality because they have more to lose
than smaller firms with respect to reputation" (Rauterkus et al., 2003). Also, DeAngelo
(1981) argues that larger auditors have stronger incentives to perform higher quality
audits. Consistent with this, larger auditors are subject to fewer audit failure lawsuits and
fewer accounting errors (Palmrose, 1986; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994).
For the first hypothesis, I focus on 31, which measures the impact of accruals on
the PIPE discount. If investors offer a lower price for firms with high accruals or low
accruals quality, I expect a negative coefficient on p3. For the second hypothesis, I focus
on 32, which measures the impact of audit quality on the PIPE discount. If investors
offer a lower price for firms with lower quality auditors, I expect a negative coefficient
on P2.
The third hypothesis examines the relation between the PIPE discount and auditor
quality after controlling for self-selection. Following Chaney et al. (2004), I first
estimate the auditor choice model:
LowAuditQualityit = fo + f/Sizeit + fl2Ageit + fl 3Aturnit + fl4Cash1t +
IlsDebti, + / 6Ratedit + / 7Analystit + s8LitRiskit + e (7)
where:
- LowAuditQuality: One if the firm did not retain a Big-4 auditor in the year of its PIPE
issuance, and zero otherwise.
- Size: Total assets.
- Age: Number of years the firm has Compustat data available.
- Aturn: Sales divided by total assets.
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- Cash: Total cash divided by total assets.
- Debt: Total debt divided by total assets.
- Rated: One if the firm has a credit rating in the year of its PIPE, and zero
otherwise.
- Analyst: One if the firm has analyst coverage in the year of its PIPE, and
zero otherwise.
- LitRisk: One if the firm is in a high accounting litigation risk industry, and
zero otherwise.
In addition to the variables used in Chaney et al. (2004), I include proxies for the
firm's information environment and litigation risk since they may influence the firm's
choice of auditors (and the auditor's choice of firms). In order to proxy for the firm's
information environment, I include analyst coverage and credit rating indicator variables.
Analyst coverage is associated with increased information search and greater firm interest
(Lafond, 2006).17 Similarly, Liu and Malatesta (2006) find that firms with credit ratings
have greater transparency, and this "reduces the extent to which informational
asymmetries can develop." Since Ireland and Lennox (2002) suggest that high quality
auditors audit firms with better information environments, I expect Analyst and Rated to
be negatively associated with LowAuditQuality.
I proxy for the firm's insurance risk by including both its market capitalization
and its industry. Francis et al. (1994) find that firms in electronics, retailing,
biotechnology, and computing industries are more subject to accounting based litigation.
This litigation risk may be particularly high in the PIPE market where firms often
underperform following their PIPE issuance (Brophy et al., 2004). High quality auditors
17 Bowen et al. (2006) is one of the few papers that examines the role of analyst coverage for firms raising
equity in the secondary markets. They examine 4,766 SEOs and find that firms with analyst coverage have
a discount 1.19% lower than firms without analyst coverage. They suggest that analysts reduce information
asymmetry during equity issuances.
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may be more likely to avoid these firms in order to reduce their litigation risk.
Accordingly, I expect LitRisk to be positively associated with LowAuditQuality.
In the second stage, I include the Inverse Mill's ratio (Lambda), which is the
selectivity correction that captures the correlation between the error terms in the first and
second stage equations:
Discountit = fo + f8lAccrualsit + fl2LowAuditQualitytt + fl3Lambdait + fl 4MVit
+ /sDebti, + / 6MBt, + B7Priceit + 8sPIPESizeit + / 9ROAit + e (8)
where:
- Discount:
- Accruals:
- LowAuditQuality:
- Lambda:
-MV:
- MB:
- Debt:
- Price:
- PIPESize:
- ROA:
Size of the discount/premium on the PIPE, where a positive value
corresponds to a PIPE price higher than the market price.
Performance-matched discretionary accruals.
One if the firm did not retain a Big-4 auditor in the year of its PIPE
issuance, and zero otherwise.
Inverse Mill's ratio.
Market value of equity.
Market-to-book ratio.
Total debt divided by total assets.
PIPE offer price.
Proceeds from the PIPE issuance.
Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.
6. Empirical Results
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample of PIPE issuers. Panel A
describes the firm characteristics for the full sample of firms. The average (median) firm
in the sample has a market value of equity of $288 million ($111 million), total assets of
$207 million ($44 million), and return on assets of -39.8% (-27.6%). These statistics are
consistent with Brophy et al. (2004) and Gomes and Phillips (2004), who find that PIPE
issuers are highly distressed and smaller than the average SEO issuer. The average PIPE
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deal size is $19.6 million, consistent with the notion that PIPE issuers have little choice
but to issue equity in the private market due to the small size of their deals. On average,
PIPEs are issued at a 9.5% discount to their market value. In contrast to much of the
literature on SEOs, I find that the mean performance-matched discretionary accruals are
close to zero. This suggests that earnings management is not pervasive prior to PIPE
issuances.
Panel B provides the investor composition for the sample. While there are many
investors involved in each PIPE transaction, I only include the investor that purchased the
majority of shares in the PIPE deal. Hedge funds are involved in more transactions than
any other investor and are the majority investor in nearly 39% of the transactions.
Mutual funds are also well represented, and are the majority investor in 15% of the
transactions. Private equity firms are likely underrepresented because I only examine
common stock PIPEs, and buyout firms tend to prefer convertible PIPEs. The Placement
Tracker database does not identify the investor type for 23% of the PIPE transactions in
my sample. Panel C provides the industry composition for the sample PIPE issuers. The
most represented industries are pharmaceuticals, healthcare products, and biotechnology.
These three industries represent close to 40% of the entire sample of firms.
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations for the variables used in my analysis.
Low audit quality is negatively correlated with the PIPE discount, providing preliminary
support for the second hypothesis. Low audit quality is also highly correlated with
analyst coverage, suggesting that the two intermediaries capture a similar underlying
construct. Performance-matched discretionary accruals are not significantly correlated
with the PIPE discount, providing weak support for the first hypothesis. There is a
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positive correlation between market value of equity, return on assets and the PIPE
discount, as well as a negative correlation between market-to-book ratio and the PIPE
discount. This suggests that larger, more profitable firms are priced at a lower discount.
Overall, the correlations provide initial evidence of the association between the PIPE
discount, accruals, and audit quality.
Table 4 compares characteristics of PIPE issuers sorted by accruals and auditor
type. Panel A shows that there are few differences between firms with positive and
negative discretionary accruals. Panel B, on the other hand, shows notable differences
between firms with and without high quality auditors. Firms with low quality auditors
have lower total assets and lower market capitalizations. Consistent with the notion that
they are of lower quality, these firms are also priced at a higher discount.
6.2 Accruals andAudit Quality Results
As seen from Table 2 and Table 4, both the mean and median performance-
matched discretionary accruals are negative, and approximately fifty percent of the firms
have negative discretionary accruals. This suggests that PIPE issuers do not manage
earnings prior to issuing equity. The institutional features of the market may drive these
results. PIPEs are issued to a select group of sophisticated investors, and this likely
dissuades many issuers from managing earnings. Also, Francis et al. (2005) suggest that
accruals may be an "innate" characteristic that is a product of the firm's operating
environment. Given the distress of many issuers, these firms might not have the
capability to manage earnings.
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Table 5 reports the results of the regression of the PIPE discount on the accruals
measures. Model 1 includes Accruals, the performance-matched discretionary accruals
measure from Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). Accruals are negative but
insignificant, suggesting that firms with high discretionary accruals are not priced
significantly lower than comparable firms with low discretionary accruals. MV is
positive and significant at the 10% level, consistent with the notion that larger firms
require lower discounts. I also find a significantly smaller discount for firms with a
higher ROA. MB is negative and significant, indicating a negative relationship between
growth and the PIPE discount. PIPESize and Debt are both insignificant, suggesting that
the deal size of the PIPE and the firm's leverage are not priced by PIPE investors.
Model 2 includes AccrualsQuality, the accruals quality measure from Dechow
and Dichev (2002). I do not find a significant relation between accruals quality and the
PIPE discount. This suggests that private investors do not price accruals quality
differently than the market prices accruals quality. These findings differ from Lee and
Masulis (2005), who find that accruals quality is negatively associated with SEO
discounts. In contrast to the SEO setting, PIPE issuers do not have high discretionary
accruals prior to their PIPE issuance and this may drive the results. 18
Table 5 also reports the results of the regression of the PIPE discount on audit
quality. LowAuditQuality is negative and significant in both Models 1 and 2, indicating
18 Table 5 shows that PIPE investors do not discount the firm's accruals or accruals quality. Given that the
firm's discretionary accruals can proxy for earnings management (among other things, including growth),
one might expect PIPE investors to place a large discount on accruals. However, unlike the SEO setting,
the mean discretionary accruals are close to zero, suggesting that earnings management does not play an
important role in the PIPE market.
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that PIPE investors discount low audit quality. 19 In economic terms, the coefficients on
LowAuditQuality in Models 1 and 2 indicate that PIPE investors offer a 5.4% discount on
firms with low quality auditors relative to comparable firms with high quality auditors.
6.2.1 Self-Selection Results
Table 6 reports the results of a regression analysis after controlling for selectivity.
I find that firm size, profitability are significant determinants of the auditor choice
decision. Consistent with Chaney et al. (2004), larger firms with more cash are more
likely to have higher quality auditors. Firms with analyst coverage and credit ratings are
also more likely to have high quality auditors, while firms in high litigation risk
industries are more likely to have low quality auditors. These results suggest that
informationally opaque, high-risk firms tend to have low quality auditors.
Panel B examines the association between the PIPE discount and audit quality
after including the Inverse Mill's ratio. Lambda, the Inverse Mill's ratio, is significant,
confirming that the two-stage regression procedure is appropriate. LowAuditQuality is
negative but insignificant, suggesting that much of the importance of audit quality to
PIPE investors is subsumed after controlling for self-selection.
7. Robustness Tests
I also examine whether the results are robust to changes in the research design.
First, I increase the sample size from 1,102 to 1,762 by including common stock PIPEs
with warrants. I originally exclude these PIPEs because warrants are valuable to
~9 In unreported tests, after including annual fixed effects, the coefficient on LowAuditQuality is still
significantly negative at -5.65.
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investors and looking at the PIPE discount in isolation does not capture the true price that
investors pay for their shares. As such, I include the warrant premium/discount as an
additional control variable. Second, I examine the sensitivity of the results to potentially
omitted variables. I include an indicator variable if the PIPE was issued without a
placement agent. Approximately half the PIPEs were issued without an agent, and firm
quality may be associated with the firm's choice to hire a placement agent. I also control
for liquidity since market frictions and transaction costs are higher for less liquid firms.
The results in Table 7 are comparable to those in Table 6 - Lambda is significant,
while LowAuditQuality is insignificant. Thus, the inclusion of a broader sample of firms
and additional control variables does not affect the main results in the paper.
Surprisingly, NoAgent is positive and highly significant, indicating that PIPEs without
placement agents are issued at a higher price than comparable PIPEs with placements
agents. This suggests higher quality firms may have less need for placement agents.
Also, Liquidity is negative, implying that investors pay a premium for less liquid firms.
Investors may offer a premium for less liquid firms because in the private market, they
can purchase illiquid shares at a fixed price, but in the public market, large purchases
dramatically affect stock prices.
8. Conclusion
Information asymmetry between firms and investors may be particularly high in
the PIPE market where many firms are small, young, and highly distressed. This
information asymmetry leads to adverse selection problems, where investors assume that
lower quality firms issue equity. However, in the PIPE market, accruals and audit quality
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can potentially distinguish between low and high quality PIPEs. High quality auditors
can enhance the credibility of the firm's financial statements and can signal firm quality.
Likewise, high quality accruals can increase the quality of the firm's financial statements
and reduce uncertainty about firm value.
While there is limited evidence that accruals are associated with firm quality, I
find a significant association between audit quality and the PIPE discount. Specifically,
firms with high quality auditors are priced 5% higher than firms with low quality
auditors. Much of this discount is due to self-selection, suggesting that higher (lower)
quality PIPEs are issued by firms with high (low) quality auditors.
High quality auditors likely avoid low quality issuers in order to disassociate
themselves with high risk, underperforming PIPEs. Similarly, low quality firms may
avoid high quality auditors because these auditors charger higher fees and are more adept
at uncovering unfavorable information. As a result, low quality, informationally opaque
PIPE issuers tend to select low quality auditors, and PIPE investors discount
characteristics of firms with low quality auditors.
Further research might examine the role of intermediaries in the equity markets in
greater depth. One avenue to explore is the audit choice decision, and the extent to which
the firm's litigation risk and information environment affect its choice of auditors. Much
of the existing literature attributes the negative relation between audit quality and equity
issuance discounts to enhanced information and insurance, without considering their roles
in the audit choice decision. A second avenue to explore is the role of placement agents
(or underwriters) in the PIPE market. The evidence is Section 7 suggests that high
quality PIPE issuers do not hire placement agents. Further research should examine the
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implications of this result, as the evidence indicates that PIPE issuers without placement
agents actually incur a much lower discount.
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Appendix 1: SEC Filing and Sample PIPE Report
Within ten days after the SEC approves the PIPE, the issuing firm reports the deal
in an 8-K. As an example, I have included Motient Corporation's SEC filing following
their closing of a common stock PIPE with warrants. 20
On October 29, 2004, Motient Corporation announced that it had signed binding
term sheets (the "Term Sheet') for a private placement of 15,353,606 shares of its
common stock, $0. 01 par value (the "Shares') at a price of $8.57 per share with
23 investors, 17 of which are current stockholders of Motient. Motient expects to
receive aggregate proceeds of $126,822,783, net of approximately $5,182,620 in
commissions to be paid to Motient's placement agent upon closing of the private
placement. In connection with this potential sale, Motient will also grant the
prospective purchasers of the Shares warrants to purchase approximately
3,838,401 additional shares common stock at a price of $8.57 per share, which
will vest if and only ifMotient does not meet certain deadlines with respect to the
registration of the Shares. The warrants will have a term of five years. We
anticipate that the definitive documents will contain certain terms and conditions
to closing that have been agreed to in the Term Sheet. Those conditions require,
among other things, that:
(1) The investors will purchase the Shares within three business days of a
request for funding by Motient. If Motient does not make such a request, the sale
of the Shares will not occur. Motient may request less than the entire number of
committed Shares, but, in this event, will be required to pay the investors a fee
equal to 2% of the sale price of the Shares that are not issued (2) Motient must
use proceeds of the sale the Shares to increase its equity ownership interest in
Mobile Satellite Ventures, L.P. ("MSV"), and the Shares shall not be sold unless
and until Motient can make such investment. (3) If the closing price of Motient's
common stock drops below $8.50 per share for five (5) consecutive trading days,
then Motient may reset the price or elect not to reset the price, and the investors
may decide to accept the new price (or the existing price if the price is not reset)
or terminate their investment obligation. (4) Motient will agree to file a
registration statement with respect to the Shares within 60 days of the closing of
the sale of the Shares, and to cause such registration statement to become
effective within 120 days of the closing of the sale of the Shares. If Motient does
not meet this deadline with respect to the filing of a registration statement, then
25% of the warrants issued in connection with the sale of the Shares will vest. If
Motient does not meet this deadline with respect to the effectiveness of the
registration statement, then 25% of the warrants issued in connection with the
sale of the Shares will vest, with an additional 25% of the warrants to vest on
20 Quoted from Motient Corporation's Form 8-K "PIPE Term Sheet" that was filed on October 29, 2004.
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each of the 30th and 60th days following the deadline with respect to
effectiveness, if the registration statement is not effective by such dates. (5)
Motient will be permitted to undertake a rights offering of up to $50 million
subsequent to the sale of the Shares, at a price equal to the sale price of the
Shares. Any such rights offering will be limited to stockholders that did not
participate in the private placement of the Shares, and participants will not have
any right of over-subscription or be able to purchase more than their pro-rata
ownership of Motient. (6) Motient is obligated to pay the investors aggregate
fees of up to $2,631,608 if the investment is not promptly consummated Such fees
increase over time. (7) The proposed transaction will be subject to other
conditions customary to the signing and closing of a securities purchase
agreement.
The following is a sample report of Motient Corporation's PIPE that is found on
Sagient Research's Placement Tracker database.21
21 Quoted from Sagient Research's Placement Tracker's website: www.placementtracker.com
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Motient Corporation (MNCP)
Stock Exchange at Closing: OTC
Industry: Telecommunications
Sub-Industry: Satellite Telecom
$131,580,429 Common Stock
Closing Date: 11/12/04
Legal Structure: PIPE
Issuer Country of Origin: United States
Transaction Stats
Dilution: 55.53%
Pricing Discount/Premium: - 42.87%
Warrant Coverage: 25.00%
Warrant Discount/Premium (Avg.): -42.87%
Placement Agent Fees: 3.94%
General
Source: Press Release (11/15/04), 10-Q (11/15/04), S-1 (01/06/05)
Structure Type: Common Stock
Gross Proceeds: $131,580,429
Cash Fees and Expenses: $5,182,620
Net Proceeds: $126,397,809
Use of Proceeds: Working Capital.
Security Pricing
Number of Securities Sold: 15,353,609
Purchase Price Per Share: $8.5700
Investor Warrants & Options
Amount:
Term:
Price:
Value:
Anti-Dilution Protection:
Investor Call Option:
Placement Agent/Financial
Placement Agent:
Estimated Cash Fees:
3,838,402
60 Months
$8.5700
$47,289,113
Standard.
None.
Advisor
Tejas Securities Group, Inc. (Exclusive Agent)
$5,182,620
Investor Rights/Company Obligations
Right of First Refusal:
Anti-Dilution Protection
/MFN:
Description:
Mandatory Registration:
Board Representation:
The Investors retain a pro-rata Right of First Refusal over any equity
securities or securities convertible into equity offered by the Company.
Standard.
Restriction on future issuances.
The Company may not issue or sell any equity securities or securities
convertible into equity prior to the effectiveness of the Registration
Statement.
The Company will file a Registration Statement covering the resale of
the Common Stock no later than 60 days following the Closing and it
will be effective within 120 days of the Closing.
None.
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Appendix 2: Background of the PIPE Market
Description of the PIPE Market
Companies looking to issue a PIPE often start the process by employing a
placement agent (Chaplinsky and Haushalter, 2003). These agents market the company
to potential hedge funds, private equity firms, banks, and other institutional investors.
For example, ENGlobal describes their PIPE issuance in their annual report:
"The first requirement was preparation of marketing material, much like
we might do for our own clients, but for a different audience. Then came
the "road show", for which the word "grueling" would best apply. It
could be called a tough audience as most fund managers by nature ask
critical questions and challenge management's assumptions... The
presentation told about ENGlobal's history, reviewed our past financials
and our plan for continued future growth. Following our presentations,
approximately half of the firms to which we presented indicated an
interest in buying a portion of the offering, and based on their level of
interest, the buying group was selected. "22
Investors negotiate the PIPE directly with the placement agent and the public
company. Given the size of many PIPEs, investors place a team on the deal to perform
due diligence on the company. This due diligence process can include analysis of audited
financials, private discussions with management, and discussions with customers and
suppliers.
After the negotiations are completed, the firm files a registration statement with
the SEC. The SEC then examines the statement, and the deal is closed "promptly upon
notice of SEC's willingness to declare effective the resale registration statement" (Kotel
and Magnas 2001). Under Rule 10b5-1 of the Exchange Act, all investors are prohibited
from trading in the issuing firm before the announcement date:
22 From ENGlobal's 2005 Annual Report.
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"Manipulative and deceptive devices" prohibited by Section 10(b) of the
[Exchange] Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder include, among other things,
the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material
nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of
trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the
issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other
person who is the source of the material nonpublic information."
Once the investors and the public company finalize the terms of the PIPE deal, the
firm files with the SEC to register shares equivalent to the number that were agreed upon
in the negotiations. The deal is typically closed and publicly announced within five days
after the registration is approved. At this point, the investor pays the public company the
agreed upon transaction price, and the public company delivers its shares to the investor.
While some investors are subjected to additional terms (such as lock-up restrictions),
most are allowed to trade shares in the public company once the deal has been
announced.
Comparing the PIPE and SEO Markets
Aside from the regulatory differences, the most notable differences between the
PIPE market and the SEO market are the investors and the issuing firms. PIPEs are sold
to hedge funds, corporations, private equity firms, mutual funds, and other institutional
investors. Thus, the PIPE market is unique in that the entire offering is sold to
sophisticated investors. SEOs, on the other hand, are sold to a more diverse, less
sophisticated group of public investors.
PIPEs are a preferred method of financing for smaller firms looking to raise
capital, because of the low fixed costs involved in the issuance. Dresner and Kim (2003)
suggest that PIPEs have several advantages in that they often do not require placement
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agents, or extensive road shows. The authors also suggest that the deal is completed in a
shorter time span and that this increases the likelihood of carrying out the financing.23
Gomes and Phillips (2004) find that smaller, less profitable firms are more likely to issue
PIPEs. They also find that PIPE issuers are significantly more distressed, more poorly
governed and more volatile than SEO issuers. Similarly, Chaplinsky and Haushalter
(2003) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) find that PIPE issuers have higher cash burn
rates, lower total assets, and lower market capitalizations than SEO issuers.
23 For example, in their 2005 annual report, ENGlobal states that "[their PIPE] transaction was smaller than
those that are normally required to cover the higher expense of a secondary offering."
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Appendix 3: Framework of the PIPE Market
Overvalued Firms
SEO
+ Higher issue price
- High fixed costs
-Six to eight month process
- Unfeasible for small firms
PIPE
+ Low placements fees
+ Two month process
+ Feasible for small firms
- Lower issue price
PIPE
+ Shares issued at a discount
+ Shares issued at fixed price
- Firm is overvalued
Short Position
+ Firm is overvalued
- High transaction costs
- Short sale restrictions
Undervalued Firms
Firm 's
Perspective
Investor's
Perspective
Knows it is undervalued,
and will be more reluctant
than an overvalued firm to
issue equity at a discount
PIPE will not
be issued
v'
Will not be willing to pay a
premium for stocks that
can be bought in the open
market at market price
A "+" corresponds to an advantage of the transaction, while a "-" corresponds to a disadvantage.
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Appendix 4: Variable Definitions
Definition
AccrualsQuality
Age
Analyst
Debt
Discount
Ieitl from the regression:
TCAit = 3o+ PlCFOi,t-1 + 02CFOit + t3CFOi,t+l+ ~it
The number of firm years available for the firm on
Compustat.
The indicator variable for analyst coverage, which is equal
to 1 if the firm had analyst coverage in the year of its PIPE,
and 0 otherwise.
The ratio of total debt to total assets.
The size of the discount/premium on the PIPE of firm i,
where a positive value corresponds to a PIPE price higher
than the market price and a negative value corresponds to a
PIPE price lower than the market price.
Lambda
Liquidity
LitRisk
LowAuditQuality
The Inverse Mill's ratio.
The monthly average number of shares traded in the twelve
months prior to the PIPE divided by the firm's shares
outstanding.
The indicator variable for firms in high litigation risk
industries, which is equal to 1 if the firm is in one of the
following SIC codes: 2833-2836, 5200-5961, 3600-3674,
3570-3577, 7370-7374. These SIC codes correspond to
four industries: biotechnology, computers, electronics, and
retailing.
The indicator variable for audit quality, which is equal to 1
if the firm did not retain either Ernst & Young,
PriceWaterhouse-Coopers, Deloitte & Touche, or KPMG in
the year of its PIPE issuance. Prior to their merger in 1998,
both Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand were
considered high quality auditors, as was Arthur Andersen,
while it was still operating.
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Variable
MB
MV
NoAgent
Performance-Matched
Accruals
PIPESize
Price
Rated
ROA
WarrantPremium
The ratio of the firm's market value to book value of
common equity.
Market value of equity, in millions.
The indicator variable for placement agents, which is equal
to 1 if the firm did not retain a placement agent for its PIPE,
and 0 otherwise.
The difference between firm i's discretionary accruals, and
the discretionary accruals for its industry ROA decile.
The amount of proceeds the firm receives from the PIPE
issuance, in millions.
The PIPE deal price.
The indicator variable for rated firms, which is equal to 1 if
the firm had a credit rating in the year of its PIPE, and 0
otherwise.
Net income before interest and taxes divided by total assets.
The ratio of the warrant price to the stock price, minus one.
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Table 1
Sample Selection
I examine common stock PIPEs from 1995 to 2005 to test my five hypotheses. The requirement
for only common stock PIPEs (as opposed to convertible PIPEs), reduces the sample
substantially, but is necessary because the Placement Tracker database reports discounts and
premiums for only these PIPEs. I exclude firms listed on the OTC bulletin board and Pink Sheets
because Compustat data is not available for most of these firms. Lastly, I require valid accruals
measures in order to examine the relation between the PIPE discount and accruals.
Selection Criteria Firms in the Sample
PIPEs from 1995-2005. 11,483
PIPEs remaining after only including firms listed on the
NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq. 6,076
Common Stock PIPEs. 2,877
Common Stock PIPEs without Warrants. 2,105
Firms with matched ticker symbols and PERMNOs from
Compustat. 1,930
Firms with valid performance-matched accruals and with
an absolute value of total accruals less than one. 1,394
Firms with a positive book value of equity. 1,370
Firms with a market capitalization greater than $10mm. 1,117
PIPEs with a valid discount/premium. 1,102
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Full Sample of Firms - 1,102 Observations
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation
Market Value of Equity (mm) 288 111 873
Total Assets (mm) 207 44 1072
PIPE Size (mm) 20 9 40
Market-to-Book Ratio 5.8 3.9 5.5
ROA (%) -39.8 -27.6 56.1
Debt to Total Assets (%) 15.2 7.2 18.3
Premium/Discount (%) -9.5 -10.0 17.6
Performance-Matched Accruals (%) -0.33 -0.52 14.2
Accruals Quality (%) 8.6 5.1 11.1
Panel B: Investor Composition ofthe Sample of PIPE Issuers
Investor Type Percentage
Hedge Fund Manager 38.8%
Mutual Fund/Institutional Advisor 14.8%
Corporation 9.9%
Venture Capital Firm 4.5%
Broker/Dealer 3.0%
Buyout Firm/Private Equity 1.7%
Bank 1.4%
Pension Fund 1.4%
Insurance 1.2%
Charitable Trust 0.5%
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Panel C: Industry Composition of the Sample of PIPE Issuers
Industry
Pharmaceuticals
Healthcare Products
Biotechnology
Computers
Software
Internet
Telecommunications
Oil & Gas
Electronics
Mining
Retail
Semiconductors
Electronic Component & Equipment
Commercial Services
Environmental Control
Energy-Alternative Sources
Healthcare Services
Pipelines
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Oil & Gas Services
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Percentage
18.4%
11.1%
9.8%
6.6%
6.3%
6.0%
5.8%
4.9%
4.6%
3.7%
3.4%
3.1%
2.3%
1.6%
1.1%
1.0%
0.9%
0.8%
0.6%
0.5%
Table 3
Correlation Matrix
This table provides Pearson correlations for various PIPE characteristics. Discount is the PIPE discount where a positive value corresponds
to a PIPE price that is higher than the market price, and a negative value corresponds to a PIPE price that is lower than the market price, MV
is the market value of equity, Assets are total assets, PIPE Size is the dollar value of the PIPE, ROA is the return on assets. MB is the
market-to-book ratio, AccrualsQuality is the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality, Accruals are the performance-matched
accruals, LowAuditQuality is equal to 1 if the PIPE issuer did not retain a Big-4 auditor in the year of its PIPE issuance, Analyst is equal to 1
if the PIPE issuer was followed by at least one analyst in the year of its PIPE issuance.
Low
PIPE Accruals Audit
Discount MV Assets Size ROA MB Quality Accruals Quality Analyst
Discount 1
MV 0.1721 1
Assets 0.0568 0.3622 1
PIPE Size 0.0621 0.5370 0.2821 1
ROA 0.0867 0.1898 0.0580 0.150 1
MB -0.0976 0.0659 -0.1140 -0.055 -0.3354 1
Accruals Quality -0.0355 -0.0791 -0.0693 -0.096 -0.2942 0.2246 1
Accruals -0.0421 0.0142 -0.0010 -0.022 0.1225 -0.0134 0.08724 1
Low Audit Quality -0.0938 -0.1450 -0.0465 -0.142 0.0757 0.0004 0.06604 0.0821 1
Analyst 0.0992 0.0691 0.0140 0.176 0.0879 -0.0105 -0.08902 0.0141 -0.241 1
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Table 4
Characteristics for Portfolios Sorted by Accruals and Audit Quality
Panel A: Sorted by Performance-Matched Accruals
Firms with Negative Discretionary Accruals
- 552 Observations
Variable Mean Std Dev
MV (mm) 209 271
Total Assets (mm) 215 1348
PIPE Size (mm) 17 18
ROA (%) -46 65
MB 5.8 5.5
Discount (%) -9.4 17.1
Firms with Positive Discretionary Accruals
- 550 Observations
Variable Mean Std Dev
MV (mm) 219 285
Total Assets (mm) 193 645
PIPE Size (mm) 15 18
ROA (%) -32 42
MB 5.8 5.5
Discount (%) -10.6 15.8
Panel B: Sorted by Audit Quality
Firms with High Quality Auditors -
952 Observations
Variable Mean Std Dev
MV (mm) 230 286
Total Assets (mm) 223 1138
PIPE Size (mm) 17 19
ROA (%) -41 56
MB 5.8 5.4
Discount (%) -9.3 16.0
Firms with Low Quality Auditors -
150 Observations
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Variable Mean Std Dev
MV (mm) 113 184
Total Assets (mm) 80 159
PIPE Size (mm) 9 13
ROA (%) -29 46
MB 5.9 6.1
Discount (%) -13.8 18.5
Table 5
Determinants of the PIPE Discount
Coefficients and t-statistics from OLS regressions on the full sample of PIPE transactions from
1995 to 2005. The dependent variable is the PIPE premium/discount, where a positive value
corresponds to a PIPE price that is higher than the market price, and a negative value corresponds
to a PIPE price that is lower than the market price. Accruals is the performance-matched
discretionary accruals. AccrualsQuality is the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of accruals
quality. LowAuditQuality is equal to 1 if the firm did not retain a Big-4 Auditor in the year of its
PIPE issuance, and 0 otherwise. MV is the market value of equity, MB is the market-to-book
ratio, Debt is the ratio of total debt to total assets, PIPESize is the dollar value of the PIPE, Price
is the deal price of the PIPE, ROA is the return on assets.
(1) Discountit = fo + flAccrualsit + fi2LowAuditQualityit + 33MVit + fl4MBit + PsDebtit +
/ 6PIPESizett + fi7Priceit + flsROAit + e
(2) Discountit = fio + flAccrualsQualityit, + l 2LowAuditQualityit + / 3MVi + fl 4MBit +
flsDebtt + PsPIPESizeit + fl 7Pricei + flsROAit + E
Variable
-5.65539
-4.60
-2.944737
(-1.08)
-5.36819
(-2.61)
0.00160
(1.73)
-0.26448
(-1.94)
1.18326
(0.31)
-0.01363
(-0.61)
-0.05701
(-0.98)
0.02341
(1.61)
Adjusted R2 5.8% 5.6%
Intercept
Accrualsit
AccrualsQualityit-.
LowAuditQualityit
MVit
MBit
Debtit
PIPESizeit
Priceit
ROA it
-5.85572
-3.72
0.86659
(0.17)
-5.57987
(-2.46)
0.00133
(1.39)
-0.19354
(-1.26)
1.96678
(0.47)
-0.01778
(-0.74)
-0.05004
(-0.81)
0.03475
(1.90)
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Model 1 Model 2
Table 6
PIPE Discount and Audit Quality - Self-Selection Tests
Panel A: First-Stage Probit Model
Panel A presents the coefficients and t-statistics from a Probit regression of the full sample of
PIPE transactions from 1995 to 2005. The dependent variable, LowAuditQuality, is equal to 1 if
the firm did not retain a Big-4 Auditor in the year of its PIPE issuance, and 0 otherwise. Size is
the total assets, Age is the number of firm years of Compustat data available, Aturn is total sales
divided by total assets, Cash is total cash divided by total assets, Debt is total debt divided by total
assets. Rated is equal to 1 if the firm had a credit rating in the year of its PIPE and 0 otherwise,
Analyst is equal to 1 if the firm had analyst coverage in the year of its PIPE and 0 otherwise,
LitRisk is equal to 1 if the firm is in a high accounting litigation risk industry and 0 otherwise.
LowAuditQualityit = flo + IJSizeir + fl2Ageit + flAturnit + fl4Cashit +
/JsDebtit + f 6Ratedit + / 7Analystit + fsLitRiskit + E
Variable Coeff. t-stat
Intercept -0.3250 -1.48
Sizeit -0.3315 -6.83
Ageit 0.0983 4.50
Aturnit 0.1474 2.75
Cashit -0.7404 -4.73
Debtit 0.7654 4.33
Ratedit -0.4566 -1.89
Analystit -0.4573 -3.62
LitRiskit 0.2361 2.11
Panel B: Second-Stage Model with the Inverse Mill's Ratio
Panel B presents the coefficients and t-statistics from the second-stage OLS regression. Discount
is the PIPE premium/discount, where a positive value corresponds to a PIPE price that is higher
than the market price, Accruals is the performance-matched discretionary accruals,
LowAuditQuality is equal to 1 if the firm did not retain a Big-4 Auditor in the year of its PIPE
issuance, and 0 otherwise, Lambda is the Inverse Mill's ratio from the first-stage regression, MV
is the market value of equity, MB is the market-to-book ratio, Price is the PIPE deal price,
PIPESize is the dollar value of the PIPE, ROA is the return on assets.
Discountit = fo + flAccrualsit + f 2LowAuditQualityit + /f3Lambdait + 84MVit
+ PsDebtt + PflMBit + B7Priceit + 8sPIPESizeit + / 9ROAit + e
Variable Coeff. t-stat
Intercept -16.31642 -5.47
Accrualsit -1.81365 -0.83
LowAuditQualityit -3.09520 -1.45
Lambdait 5.66476 3.95
MVit 0.00841 0.86
MBit -0.16517 -1.19
Debtit 3.24788 0.85
Priceit -0.10645 -1.80
PIPESizeit -0.02113 -0.94
ROA it 0.02573 1.81
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Table 7
Robustness Check: Including PIPEs with Warrants and Additional Control Measures
Coefficients and t-statistics from an OLS regression on the sample of PIPE transactions, including
those with warrants, from 1995 to 2005. The dependent variable is the PIPE premium/discount,
where a positive value corresponds to a PIPE price that is higher than the market price, and a
negative value corresponds to a PIPE price that is lower than the market price. Accruals is the
performance-matched discretionary accruals, LowAuditQuality is equal to 1 if the firm did not
retain a Big-4 Auditor in the year of its PIPE issuance, and 0 otherwise, Lambda is the Inverse
Mill's ratio, MV is the market value of equity, MB is the market-to-book ratio, Price is the deal
price of the PIPE, PIPESize is the dollar value of the PIPE, ROA is the return on assets,
WarrantPremium is the premium/discount on the warrants relative to the stock price at closing.
NoAgent is equal to 1 if the firm does not hire placement agent and 0 otherwise, and Liquidity is the
monthly average number of shares traded in the twelve months prior to the PIPE divided by the
firm's shares outstanding.
Discounti,= fo + flAccrualsi + fl2LowAuditQualityj, + fl3Lambdat + /f4MiK, + fsMBi +
fl 6Debti, + B7Priceir + flsPIPESizeit + /fROAj, + floWarrantPremiumit + fliNoAgentit +
fl 2 Liquidityit + e
Accrualsit
LowAuditQualityit
Lambdait
MVit
MBit
Debtit
Priceit
PIPESizeit
ROAit
WarrantPremiumit
NoAgentit
VariableC
-37.94579
-1.56645
-2.55945
9.38668
-0.00328
0.01473
6.74167
-0.29881
0.14798
0.01939
8.03256
4.59736
-1.68427
Adjusted R2 9.8%
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-6.76
-0.89
-1.17
4.91
-2.36
0.09
3.36
-3.71
4.62
1.29
7.98
2.59
-2.63
I Coeff. I t-stat
i a -w ..
Adjusted R2 9.8%
Intercept
I LiquidityitL
